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M
any countries emerging from periods of mass vio-
lence or dictatorship have recognized the limits
inherent in criminal prosecutions. In such cases,
transitioning societies have decided that criminal
trials simply cannot address the wide scope of the crimes commit-
ted, bring to justice the large number of perpetrators, or promote
the country’s need for reconciliation. As a result, these transition-
ing societies have chosen to prosecute only the most senior perpe-
trators of past violence, and have created alternative justice mech-
anisms such as truth commissions or lustration programs to
address the crimes committed by lower-level actors. Rwanda, how-
ever, has differed in its response to the mass atrocities of its recent
past. 
From April to July 1994, Rwanda’s ethnic Tutsis and moder-
ate Hutus were targeted for extinction in a genocide that had been
planned for years. At least 800,000 people were killed in the vio-
lence that ensued. The number of people suspected of taking part
in the killings was staggering: state authorities have estimated that
more than 761,000 persons, or slightly less than half the adult
male Hutu population of Rwanda in 1994, ultimately would be
accused of crimes related to the genocide.1
After the violence subsided, Rwanda’s government, like oth-
ers emerging from periods of atrocity or repression, had numerous
goals: to rebuild the country, establish a historical record of the
genocide, ensure that those who committed crimes did not escape
with impunity, impart to survivors and victims that justice was
being done, and reintegrate the vast numbers of perpetrators into
their communities without provoking retributive violence against
them. Like many transitioning societies, however, Rwanda’s courts
were in shambles, and prosecution and imprisonment of all perpe-
trators seemed an impossible task.2 But while many other countries
responded to similar dilemmas by devising alternatives to wide-
spread prosecutions, Rwanda embraced a model centered on crim-
inal prosecution. In an attempt to overcome its institutional inca-
pacities and the logistical hurdles involved in such an endeavor, the
government took a traditional Rwandan mechanism, known as
gacaca, and transformed it into a system of informal criminal
courts, which it called gacaca courts.
The details of Rwanda’s gacaca court system have been
explored at length by other authors, and so I recount them only
briefly here.3 Historically, a gacaca was a community-based infor-
mal arbitration convened by the parties to a civil dispute; its 
legitimacy was founded upon the willing participation of the 
parties and the community. The parties typically chose a respected
person to serve as a neutral arbiter, and the outcome was limited 
to resolution of the minor dispute at hand. Gacaca had as its 
goal the achievement of a settlement that was accepted by both 
parties to the dispute, and the restoration of tranquility within 
the community.  
Yet the gacaca courts established to try perpetrators of the
1994 genocide bear sharp contrast to this traditional Rwandan
conciliation institution for which they are named. Gacaca courts
are state-sanctioned criminal tribunals created by statute, whose
legitimacy is derived from their status as governmental institutions.
Their stated functions are to punish crimes committed during the
genocide, establish a truthful history of that period, eliminate a
“culture of impunity” within Rwanda, and reconcile Rwandans
with each other.4 Their mandate empowers them as the courts of
first instance for cases ranging from theft or destruction of prop-
erty through homicide. Judges for gacaca courts are chosen by
community election; they are given minimal training in criminal
law, serve without pay, and may impose sentences ranging up to 
30 years’ imprisonment. Each adult Rwandan not accused of
involvement in crimes during the genocide is tasked with taking
part in the gacaca court proceedings as a type of co-prosecutor 
and witness.
Most commentary on Rwanda’s gacaca courts can be roughly
grouped into three categories. The most critical measures the
gacaca court process against objective international human rights
standards, and finds it to be sorely lacking. Meanwhile, the pan-
glossian position celebrates gacaca courts as a novel new direction
in transitional justice, one that couples traditional local institu-
tions with more modern judicial practices, and will be responsible
for transformative democratic change in Rwanda. The middle
position accepts both the former criticism, and, drawing somewhat
on the latter applause, concludes that given the resource limita-
tions and the political and social conditions in post-genocide
Rwanda, genocide trials by gacaca courts were the best possible
mechanism for attempting to achieve Rwanda’s transitional justice
goals. Although commentators espousing either the critical or pan-
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glossian positions take the time to challenge the other, little atten-
tion has been devoted to questioning the moderate position,
namely that Rwanda could not have done any better, given its
social and political situation.
By relying on gacaca courts, Rwanda sought to pursue a com-
prehensive prosecution strategy and set out to try every person
who took part in the genocide. But for the hundreds of thousands
of accused perpetrators, the Rwandan government has lowered its
standards of justice in the name of expediting trials and convic-
tions. And in pursuing prosecutions of questionable fairness, the
government may also have sacrificed the possibility of societal rec-
onciliation and risked unleashing another cycle of violence in a
country that has yet to recover from the genocide.
Tackling Corruption Within Gacaca Courts
Early on, many Rwandans believed that the gacaca court sys-
tem could serve as an effective transitional justice mechanism for
their troubled country. During an 18-month pilot phase that
established a mere 750 gacaca courts across the country, more than
2000 defendants pleaded guilty, and during the first nine months
of nationwide gacaca court trials, nearly 6000 defendants were
convicted. For comparison, a total of just over 7000 were tried by
Rwandan criminal courts from 1996 to 2002.5 However, even in
the initial stages of this process, not everyone believed the gacaca
courts would be fair; more than 10,000 Rwandans fled the coun-
try in anticipation of gacaca court inquiries, fearing “false accusa-
tions and unfair trials.”6 Unfortunately, many of these fears were
quickly realized.   
Troubles began with the first phase of the gacaca trials. At this
stage, cell-level gacaca courts were tasked with classifying the
crimes of which defendants stood accused. Category One crimes
include the planning or organization of killings, as well as the com-
mission of sexual crimes such as rape. Rwanda’s ordinary criminal
courts retain jurisdiction over these Category One offenses, which
carry with them penalties ranging from 25 years imprisonment to
capital punishment. By contrast, murder, complicity in murder,
and causing bodily injury are classified as Category Two offenses,
while property crimes fall under Category Three. These Category
Two and Three crimes are tried before gacaca courts, with the pos-
sibility of more lenient punishment – including community serv-
ice and credit for pretrial detention. Moreover, a defendant in
Rwanda’s judicial system faces an agonizing wait before the begin-
ning of an ordinary criminal trial; because gacaca court trials for
most defendants would begin far sooner than trial by the ordinary
criminal courts, defendants who are prosecuted in the gacaca
courts likely face shorter overall terms of imprisonment (including
pretrial detention) regardless of the verdict. For a criminal defen-
dant, then, categorization is critical.  
Soon after the gacaca courts’ inception, the media began
uncovering incidents of gacaca court judges being bribed by defen-
dants in order to ensure that the defendants’ cases were not classi-
fied as Category One, and thus making certain that defendants
would appear before gacaca courts rather than ordinary criminal
courts.7 Further, since gacaca proceedings began in mid-2006, cor-
ruption scandals have only continued, further marring public sup-
port for these courts. Under the law establishing the gacaca courts,
judges (who number approximately 200,000) serve without pay,
thus raising their susceptibility to corruption. Although no com-
prehensive statistics are available to establish the exact number of
gacaca court judges accused of bribery or removed from their posi-
tions, news articles from the Rwandan media announce with
unfortunate regularity such occurrences.8
Perhaps more important than the number of gacaca court
judges sacked for corruption, however, is the public perception of
judicial wrongdoing. Given the prevalence of media reports citing
such bribery, and their geographical distribution, many people
believe that there is a widespread problem of corruption among
gacaca court officials. Public statements by the administrative head
of the gacaca courts confirm that the Rwandan government itself
recognizes the seriousness of the bribery issue.9
Violence and Threats of 
Violence Deterring Witnesses
Even more concerning than corruption scandals is the
increase in violence toward genocide survivors who are called as
witnesses in gacaca court trials, and toward gacaca court officials
themselves. Sadly, a number of witnesses and gacaca court officials
have been killed across the country, often in a brutal manner echo-
ing the savagery that marked the 1994 genocide. In one chilling
case, the president of a gacaca court in Gisanza cell was murdered,
with her body “hacked into pieces” and her “eyes plucked out.”10
A recent report by a respected Rwandan human rights organ-
ization concludes that gacaca court witnesses suffer harassment and
intimidation, and lack physical security.11 In the second half of
2006 alone, at least 40 gacaca court witnesses were victims of mur-
der or attempted murder.12 According to another Rwandan NGO
that tracks reprisals, this figure represents a severe rise in the level
of violence against gacaca court witnesses. One witness had her
house set on fire while her family slept inside; they narrowly
escaped.13 Another witness, an 80 year-old widow, survived after
“Even in the initial stages of this process, not everyone 
believed the gacaca courts would be fair; more than 10,000
Rwandans fled the country in anticipation of gacaca court
inquiries, fearing false accusations and unfair trials.”
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she, her daughter, and her grandchildren were attacked with a
machete.14 Although these egregious incidents of violence were
reported, it seems likely that many other attacks have not found
their way into the media.
Clearly, attacks against witnesses are aimed at discouraging or
punishing testimony before the gacaca courts. Threats of violence
have had a chilling effect on witness testimony, and thus on the
ability of gacaca courts both to establish a historical record of the
genocide and to signal an end to impunity. Entire communities of
survivors have refused to testify after suffering harassment and
threats, afraid to risk their lives after receiving no action or reassur-
ance of safety from police or other state authorities.15 In a cruel
twist of fate, at least one gacaca court conducted its proceedings at
the precise site where remains of genocide victims had been hastily
buried in 1994, though as a result of threats from a perpetrator’s
family, “no member of the 450 families in the three villages came
up to reveal the information.”16
The pattern of violence surrounding the gacaca courts is 
not lost on Rwandan citizens. As an opinion piece in Rwanda’s
leading daily newspaper noted, “[o]ne may wonder why all the
deaths today are associated with either Gacaca leaders or genocide
survivors.”17 The violence against gacaca court officials and wit-
nesses preparing to testify in genocide trials before the gacaca
courts has become so severe that Rwandan president Paul Kagame
and other senior government officials have highlighted it as a ris-
ing concern, urging Rwandans to take steps to prevent it.18 But in
spite of such calls for solidarity with survivors and victims, the
reactions to these killings and acts of intimidation offer further evi-
dence of the continuing divide within Rwanda; while victims and
survivors have spoken out against these serious problems, persons
who have been accused of crimes, or who fear being so accused,
have remained silent even when present at the murder of gacaca
court witnesses.19
Public Participation Evaporating
In another ominous sign for gacaca courts, public participa-
tion in these proceedings is on the decline. Penal Reform
International has reported that although attendance at gacaca
court proceedings has remained high (likely in part due to the fact
that absence is punishable by law), participation has markedly
decreased since the proceedings began.20 Avocats Sans Frontières, 
a Belgian human rights NGO, seconded this observation, noting
that “attendees, often numerous, only participated minimally 
in the proceedings.”21 From this, Human Rights Watch has 
concluded that gacaca courts “were supposed to draw their 
legitimacy from popular participation, but many Rwandans did
not trust them and boycotted the sessions.”22 As one goal of the
gacaca courts is to create among the citizenry an established truth
of what occurred during the genocide, this marked decline in 
public participation bodes poorly for the effectiveness of this jus-
tice strategy.
The reasons for the decline in public participation are 
varied. As noted above, these include the fear of violence against
participants, and the perception that gacaca court judges are 
corrupt. In addition, tens of thousands of gacaca court judges 
have been accused of participating themselves in crimes during 
the genocide; no doubt the suspected culpability of those intended
to sit in judgment has discouraged or intimidated potential 
witnesses.23
With Rwandan citizens increasingly detached from the
process of rendering justice in gacaca courts, the country seems
close to a dangerous abandonment by would-be participants of the
goals of the gacaca courts process. If this continues, many survivors
will not testify about their experiences, and perpetrators may not
be convicted of all the crimes they committed. As Penal Reform
International concludes, “a meaningful participation of the popu-
lation is the only way to know the truth about the genocide inti-
mately and also to give full meaning to a process where the final
objective is to lead to the reconciliation of Rwandans.”24 In the
absence of meaningful public participation in the gacaca proceed-
ings, it will also prove impossible to establish a historical record of
the genocide, conduct fair trials, or impart to survivors and victims
that justice has been done.25
Failure to Provide Reconciliation
Another of the gacaca courts’ goals, namely societal reconcil-
iation, is proving elusive as well. In particular, the refusal of the
gacaca courts to investigate crimes committed by Rwandan
Patriotic Army (RPA) forces (who were led by Rwanda’s current
president Paul Kagame)26 against Hutu civilians, or reprisal attacks
after the genocide, have led many Hutus to question the stated
goal of reconciliation.27 Instead of healing the rift between Hutus
and Tutsis, the operation of the gacaca courts is threatening to
“So long as this intolerance for criticism remains, 
the public disaffection with the gacaca courts will result 
not in needed policy shifts, but instead in decreasing 
participation and abandonment of the noble goals 
that the gacaca courts set out to accomplish.”
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reinforce it by affirming group personas of victim and perpetrator,
innocent and guilty.
In part, it is the gacaca courts’ structure, which pits the pop-
ulation against the perpetrators, that makes them unlikely to be
able to effect societal reconciliation. Even traditional criminal tri-
als, which by their adversarial nature focus on determining individ-
ual guilt rather than establishing a comprehensive historical truth,
focus on retribution and deterrence at the expense of reconcilia-
tion. If ordinary criminal prosecutions do not constitute a justice
strategy conducive to reconciliation, gacaca court trials, which are
administered by minimally-trained civilians without significant
organization or legal rules, are even less likely to do so.  
Even the official explanation by the Rwandan government of
the reconciliatory effect of the gacaca courts fails to convince, read-
ing more like a chance for participatory popular punishment,
rather than an opportunity to bring together perpetrators, victims,
and survivors. In one official document, the government has
explained: 
The Gacaca Courts system will allow the population of the
same Cell, the same Sector to work together in order to judge
those who have participated in the genocide, identify the vic-
tims and rehabilitate the innocents. The Gacaca Courts system
will thus become the basis of collaboration and unity …28
To the extent, however, that gacaca court proceedings assign
collective guilt to Hutus by ignoring crimes committed by the
RPA, and permit primarily Tutsi survivors to stand in judgment of
primarily Hutu perpetrators, gacaca courts will hinder reconcilia-
tion within the country. As William Schabas has noted, “[r]ather
than resolve the outstanding cases … the initial gacaca [court]
hearings appear to have opened a Pandora’s box.”29
No Room For Criticism
Given these concerns, the absence of political space for criti-
cism of the gacaca courts is disconcerting. When a member of
Rwanda’s senate misspoke in response to a legal question about the
powers of the gacaca courts, his statement was made out to be “a
scandalous attack on Gacaca courts.” Three commissions of
inquiry were opened, and the senator faced severe pressure to
resign from office.30 Because of incidents like this, many
Rwandans have been too intimidated to challenge gacaca courts.
The Rwandan government has itself undermined its policy of
national unity, at times having accused those who have spoken out
against gacaca courts of harboring a “genocidal ideology.”31 One
local government official, who accused Rwandans that failed to
attend gacaca court proceedings of having “genocide and ethnic
ideologies,” threatened that their continuing failure to attend
would be “seriously punished.” Illustratively, the citizens were
undertaking a boycott of the local gacaca court based on allega-
tions that the judges had been soliciting bribes from criminal
defendants.32
Human rights groups have also been forced to suspend their
operations, sometimes permanently, after questioning aspects of
the gacaca court process. Human Rights Watch has noted that “as
high-level [Rwandan government] officials focused on ‘genocidal
ideology’ in speeches and ceremonies, Rwandan and international
NGOs tailored their activities to avoid confrontation with author-
ities. Human rights organizations … avoided taking stands likely
to draw official ire.”33 Unfortunately, this government crackdown
on criticism has served to silence those best positioned to speak
frankly about the gacaca process.  
Ordinary citizens have suffered from the government’s confla-
tion of criticism regarding gacaca courts and disloyalty to the state,
as well, and sadly there are signs that this climate of intolerance for
criticism may be undermining the very participation upon which
the legitimacy of the gacaca courts depends. As such, gacaca courts
have not led to the sort of “democratic dialogue” between the 
governed and the government that they might otherwise have 
fostered.34
Conclusion
Torn between the need to reconcile a deeply divided popula-
tion and the duty, both moral and legal, to punish those who
sought to eradicate an entire people, Rwanda’s attempt at combin-
ing criminal justice and community reconciliation might have pro-
vided a “third way” for societies in transition. As it has been imple-
mented, however, the gacaca court system — fraught with
corruption and violence, and insulated from much-needed change
by a government that brooks no criticism — is quickly proving
that in seeking to achieve both justice and reconciliation, the
gacaca courts may very well achieve neither. 
Sadly, the net effect of the gacaca courts on the development
of open discussion in Rwanda has been nil to negative; not only
has their operation not resulted in a free dialogue between the gov-
ernment and the population, they instead have provided another
basis for the government to accuse critics and dissenters of possess-
ing a “divisive ideology.”35 So long as this intolerance for criticism
remains, the public disaffection with the gacaca courts will result
not in needed policy shifts, but instead in decreasing participation
and abandonment of the noble goals that the gacaca courts set out
to accomplish. Unfortunately, the establishment of the gacaca
court system may foreclose the possibility of other transitional jus-
tice institutions, such as a truth commission, that could help the
country to achieve reconciliation.  
Ultimately, then, the gacaca courts likely will be unable to
achieve their stated goals of psychologically rebuilding Rwanda,
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establishing a historical record of the genocide, avoiding impunity,
showing that justice is being done, and reintegrating hundreds 
of thousands of perpetrators into their communities without 
provoking retributive violence. By themselves, the gacaca courts
today seem to be offering only popular punishment — and “pop-
ular” only in the sense that it is carried out by members of the 
population, not in that it enjoys broad approval. Yet the gacaca
courts are a reality, and the Rwandan government seems unlikely
to significantly alter their operation, even in the face of obvious
deficiencies.  
If Rwanda is to break the cycle of violence and vengeance that
has plagued it since independence, it must find a new way to
achieve reconciliation between perpetrators and victims who 
must live side by side in a densely-populated territory. If the cur-
rent relative peace is to be sustained, the government must accept
that the impartial rule of law, and not draconian treatment of pol-
icy critics, can best prevent the escalation of grievance into vio-
lence. If the goals of justice and reconciliation are not met,
Rwandans will live daily with the risk that another tragic collective
bloodletting may follow. HRB
20
1 See Human Rights Watch, Overview of Human Rights Issues in Rwanda at 1,
available at http://hrw.org/wr2k6/pdf/rwanda.pdf (Jan. 2006) (accessed Dec.
4, 2006) (761,000 figure); Compare with Jacques Fierens, “Gacaca Courts:
Between Fantasy and Reality,” 3 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 896, 897 (2005) (“no
other genocide has torn apart the social fabric to this extent, as those in power
mobilized an unprecedented majority of the civilian population against a
minority which often included neighbours, friends and relatives.”).
2 Compare Rwanda National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions, “Gacaca
Overview,” available at http://www.inkiko-gacaca.gov.rw/En/EnIntroduction.
htm (gacaca courts were created in part because of estimates that ordinary
criminal trials of the roughly 120,000 Rwandans already imprisoned for
crimes relating to the genocide “would take more than a century”), with CIA
World Factbook, “Rwanda,” available at https://www.cia.gov/cia/publica-
tions/factbook/geos/rw.html (accessed Dec. 9, 2006) (average Rwandan life
expectancy is 47.3 years). 
3 See generally Erin Daly, Between Punitive and Reconstructive Justice: The
Gacaca Courts in Rwanda, 34 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 355 (2002); Fierens,
“Gacaca Courts: Between Fantasy and Reality”; William A. Schabas, Genocide
Trials and Gacaca Courts, 3 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 879 (2005).
4 See Rwanda National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions, “The Objectives of 
the Gacaca Courts,” available at http://www.inkiko-gacaca.gov.rw/En/En
Objectives.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2006).
5 See Amnesty International, “Gacaca: A Question of Justice,” at 17 (Dec.
2002), available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/AFR470072002
ENGLISH/$File/AFR4700702.pdf (accessed Dec. 1, 2006).
6 Human Rights Watch, supra note 1, at 1.
7 See, e.g., The New Times (Kigali), “Gacaca Judges Arrested Over Corrup-
tion,” (Sept. 26, 2006). 
8 See, e.g.,The New Times (Kigali), “Gacaca Judges Fired Over Corruption,”
(Dec. 12, 2006); Emmy Namurinda, The New Times (Kigali), “Gacaca Judges,
Leaders Grilled,” (Nov. 19, 2006); The New Times (Kigali), “Corrupt Inyanga-
mugayo Will Hurt Gacaca Justice,” (Sept. 30, 2006); The New Times (Kigali),
“Graft Threatens Gacaca Courts,” (Sept. 27, 2006); The New Times (Kigali),
“Gacaca President Held Over Corruption,” (Sept. 19, 2006).
9 See The New Times (Kigali), “Graft Threatens Gacaca Courts,” (Executive
Secretary of the National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions said to comment that
“corruption had eaten into some Gacaca courts”). 
10 Paul Ntambara, The New Times (Kigali), “Gacaca Head Murdered,” (Nov.
26, 2006) (referring to “anti-Gacaca campaign against genocide survivors and
Gacaca judges”). 
11 Edward K. Mwesigye, The New Times (Kigali), “LIPRODHOR Launches
Report on Gacaca,” (Nov. 21, 2006).
12 Karen McVeigh, The Observer (London), “Spate of Killings Obstructs
Rwanda’s Quest for Justice,” (Dec. 3, 2006).
13 The New Times (Kigali), “Gacaca Witness’ House Set Ablaze,” (Oct. 22,
2006).
14 The New Times (Kigali), “Gacaca Witnesses Attacked,” (Dec. 18, 2006).
15 See Steven Baguma, The New Times (Kigali), “Genocide Survivor Boycotts
Gacaca, Cites Harassment,” (Nov. 16, 2006).
16 The New Times (Kigali), “Mushubati Residents Silent on Genocide
Remains,” (Dec. 14, 2006).
17 Gasheegu Muramila, The New Times (Kigali), “Why France Should Keep
Quiet,” (Nov. 27, 2006).
18 See The New Times (Kigali), “Sterner Measures Adopted for Survivors’ 
Murders,” (Dec. 21, 2006); Robert Mukombozi, The New Times (Kigali),
“Kagame Warns on Killings,” (Nov. 28, 2006).
19 See Paul Ntambara and Ignatius Ssuna, The New Times (Kigali), “Genocide
Survivor Hacked to Death,” (Nov. 23, 2006) (“despite calls for help, no one
had come to the victim’s rescue”); Paul Ntambara, The New Times (Kigali),
“Tackle Genocide Survivors, Witnesses’ Security Issue,” (Dec. 7, 2006) (“other
residents looked on as Musasira [witness] was being chopped into pieces”) 
20 See Penal Reform International, “Monitoring and Research Report on the
Gacaca: Information-Gathering During the National Phase,” at 48 (June
2006), available at http://www.penalreform.org/publications/ reports/gacaca/
rep-ga8-2006-infogathering-en.pdf (accessed Jan. 2, 2007).
21 Avocats Sans Frontières, “Rapport Annuel 2005,” at 11, available at
http://asf.be/FR/FRpropos/Rapport%202005.pdf (accessed Dec. 10, 2006)
(author’s trans.).
22 Human Rights Watch, supra note 1, at 1.
23 The New Times (Kigali), “Gacaca Jails Over 800, Acquits 700,” (Aug. 5,
2006) (citing report by Rwandan government office in charge of gacaca courts
indicating that authorities suspect 45,396 gacaca court judges of having com-
mitted crimes during the genocide).
24 Penal Reform International, “Monitoring and Research Report on the
Gacaca: Information-Gathering During the National Phase” at 40.
25 See id. at 25 (“everything depends on the active and voluntary participation
of the population, which it alone can allow.”).
26 Human Rights Watch, supra note 1, at 1.
27 See Andrew England, Financial Times (London), “Reconciliation: The Next
Generation Need to Be Brought Up as Agents of Peace,” at 5 (Dec. 5, 2006).
28 Rwanda National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions, “The Objectives of the
Gacaca Courts.” 
29 Schabas, supra note 3, at 881.
30 James Munyaneza, The New Times (Kigali), “Senator Augustine Iyamure-
mye Under Probe,” (July 12, 2006).
31 Human Rights Watch, supra note 1, at 1.
32 See The New Times (Kigali), “Kamembe Residents Boycott Gacaca,” (Sept.
29, 2006).
33 Human Rights Watch, supra note 1, at 3.
34 Cf. Aneta Wierzynska, “Consolidating Democracy Through Transitional
Justice: Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts,” 79 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1934 (2004).
35 Contra id. at 1963, 1966 (noting that “Rwanda’s power schisms are 
reflected within Gacaca in a way that puts the goals of justice and reconcilia-
tion at serious risk” though nonetheless concluding that “[w]ithin Gacaca, a
direct link has been created between citizens and the State, Hutus and Tutsis,
and ultimately between transitional justice and democracy” and referring to
gacaca courts as “a purely public-generated, non-government-censored 
phenomenon”). 
ENDNOTES: Rwanda’s Troubled Gacaca Courts
5
Le Mon: Rwanda’s Troubled Gacaca Courts
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2007
